WWF EU Blog

During the current Republican primary race for president of the United States, the candidate Herman Cain promoted a plan called ‘9/9/9’, referring to flat percentage rates for various taxes. It was simple, and made a good TV soundbite – but that was its only benefit. Amusingly, saying 9/9/9 on the podium made Cain sound distinctly like a German objecting strenuously to his own plan.

Empty repetition of numbers with a German tint was on my mind yesterday when I heard EU Energy Commissioner Gunther  Oettinger say that perhaps we will soon move from our current 20/20/20 targets (20% greenhouse gas cuts and 20% renewable energy by 2020) to 30/30/30 targets. My first thought was ‘nein/nein/nein!’

A 30% greenhouse gas target for 2030 isn’t even the Commission’s own goal, as laid out in the 2050 low carbon roadmap last year. It states that 40% cuts achieved domestically is on the least-cost pathway to 80% cuts. The Council has stated the goal of up to 95% cuts, and our current 20% cuts aren’t even being achieved fully domestically. Both facts mean that the 40% level in 2030 is a minimum – aiming higher than 80% in 2050 and incorporating credits for actions outside the EU would mean an even higher target.

In other words 30% isn’t anywhere near acceptable. In fact, many countries in the EU have been calling for a move to 30% already in 2020.

Renewable energy goals for 2030 are less clear. The various pathways in Oettinger’s 2050 energy roadmap, published in December last year, although yielding quite different levels of renewables by 2050, all pass (coincidentally?) close to 30% in 2030. Critiques of the roadmap make it clear that the 30% level is likely an artefact of some dodgy assumptions about the costs of renewable energy. It is also significantly below the potential identified by the European Renewable Energy Council: 45% produced domestically. Adding the possibility of imports from Europe’s neighbours, the potential could be even higher.

Post-2020 policy, perhaps a climate and energy package for 2030, is certainly needed at some point soon. Providing clarity longer-term is essential for investment, and we need a chance to refine policy further based on what we’ve learned over the past decade. What that package should look like is the focus much thinking this year, and facile answers are premature.

Oettinger’s statement was passed off in the guise of a half-joking suggestion. But he made the same comment during the informal ministerial a week earlier in Horsens, Denmark. If his goal is to create the same kind of meme that 20/20/20 has become, then the answer now should be: nein/nein/nein!

A common sport at COPs is watching the EU struggling to talk to anyone except themselves as they endure endless rounds of internal coordination. When push comes to shove in the final negotiations, they are often so inward focused that they are caught flat-footed.

Durban looks like risking a repeat of this pattern, with potentially dire consequences for a final agreement. Indeed it is perhaps more serious than ever, as it is the EU leadership itself, the Polish presidency, that is the main troublemaker.

Poland is insisting on full carryover of ‘hot air’ AAU excesses beyond 2012. This could slash real reduction effort in the second commitment period by almost 5 Gt at the global level. Other EU Parties want the opposite approach: a complete ban on carryover. Obviously cancellation of hot air would be the most responsible approach. But there are options, including those being floated inside the EU delegation, which could yield a compromise formulation that retains environmental integrity.

EU negotiators are mandated to propose a solution to the hot air issue in these negotiations, as an essential part of agreeing to CP2. Not fixing hot air could well mean Europe can’t agree to extend the KP, which would unravel the whole conference.

After months of positioning itself as willing to accept an extension of the KP in exchange for a roadmap on a future deal, it would be the height of irony if the EU itself explodes the whole delicately balanced negotiations. It would make their performance in Copenhagen look like a brilliant success.

Poland’s role here is clear. It is the EU leader, and it is responsible for ensuring the EU can negotiate firmly to achieve its main aims of a mandate for a future agreement, a second period of Kyoto, and implementation of the Cancun agreements and Bali action plan. It should stop stubbornly insisting on its own parochial interests and get on with the job it is meant to do.

Since the Copenhagen climate conference delivered a tepid political statement about combating climate change, the United States has tried to argue that it has all it wants out of an international accord. That is to say, very light on international systems to set and enforce obligations. The US claims this is largely a matter of equity – as long as competitors like China don’t have parallel obligations, it would be unfair to take on more binding commitments.

The US position has been the equivalent of a trump card, as freedom from binding targets has been an article of faith for developing countries for 20 years. This left America feeling comfortable that it and China are confreres in their desire to avoid targets.

Now in Durban, the Chinese government has been floating an informal proposal that would involve them potentially taking on targets within a decade. The conditions for agreeing to this would include a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in the interim, and a review of its implementation.

After US vilification of China on climate for nearly fifteen years, it may well be that the shoe will shortly be on the other foot. The US continues pushing off climate action largely because influential political groups basically don’t believe in undertaking any. Meanwhile China is showing signs of using the same period preparing to take obligations, possibly emerging the more ambitious of the two.  We’ll see how this evolves in Durban and beyond.